

# The impact of geopolitical developments on energy security and environment

15<sup>th</sup> Japan-Europe Forum

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
### The increasingly Europeanised market framework for the energy transition A holistic view of old and new needs for action and regulatory areas

Market design (Electricity, hydrogen)Greenhouse gas emission targets & -pricingInfrastructure -Planning &Sovereignty- orientated	<ul> <li>Process acceleration in all areas</li> <li>Greenhouse gas emission reduction <ul> <li>Climate neutrality targets and paths</li> <li>Greenhouse gas pricing</li> <li>Other emission reduction instruments</li> </ul> </li> <li>Market design <ul> <li>for electricity (gas and hydrogen, CO2)</li> <li>Refinancing instruments, localisation signals</li> <li>European integration and security of supply</li> </ul> </li> <li>Infrastructure <ul> <li>Target grid planning (for transmission and distribution grids)</li> <li>Integrated design of electricity, hydrogen &amp; CO2 networks</li> <li>Municipal heat planning</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
-Regulation Industrial policy	Industrial policy
Process acceleration	<ul> <li>Securing the European value chains</li> <li>Improving competitive position of European suppliers</li> <li>Energy costs and smart industrial electricity cost solutions</li> </ul>




#### Natural gas, oil, electricity and CO2 prices (and costs) The 2022/2023 shock waves of geopolitics (partly caused by German energy policy)

Natural gas, oil, electricity wholesale & EUA prices & CO2 price compensation



- Russian invasion of Ukraine with far-reaching consequences for security of supply and energy prices (prices for fuel, electricity and CO<sub>2</sub> have risen massively)
- Renewable shares are slowly lowering prices, CO2 prices (for base price) are counteracting this partly
- 2020s remain critical in terms of prices (despite current declining price levels), uncertainties remain high
- Challenge of industrial policy: transformation support needed, but coexistence of old & transformative options (current shifts to other regions often not towards green production)


### Transition to climate neutrality (Germany/Europe) in a changed geopolitical environment All strategies remain robust, some implementation mechanisms/sequences may change



Six key strategic elements for a successful transformation to climate-neutrality

- Paving the way for transformative options
- Actively managing exit game for unsustainable options
- Initiating necessary infrastructure adjustments (expansion/ conversion/ decommissioning) with sufficient lead times
- Supporting timely ramp-up of the necessary value chains
- Making innovations available in time and avoiding the innovation dilemma
- Taking into account (international) learning and diffusion processes

## A mainstream projection: There are and will be corridors, the ranges are relatively narrow The 10-43-17 archetype and the C<sup>2</sup>SIA tracks of managing structural change



Long-term system characteristics

- <u>1,0</u>00 TWh renewable electricity for direct use (mainly wind & solar, land availability restrictions)
- <u>4</u>00 TWh imported hydrogen and hydrogen derivates
- <u>3</u>00 TWh biomass (mainly cascade use)
- <u>1</u>00 TWh domestic hydrogen (and some hydrogen derivates)
- <u>7</u>0 million tons CO<sub>2</sub> to be stored in geological formation

Managing broad structural change

- <u>C</u>oordination-intensive
- <u>Capital-intensive</u>
- New <u>spatial patterns</u>
- <u>Infrastructure-intensive</u>
- <u>A</u>cceptance-sensitive

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### After the wake-up call: New awareness on resilience (in a comprehensive sense) as a new challenge to sustainability strategies (and beyond)

	Raw material extraction	Raw material processing	(Sub-) Components	Goods
Photovoltaics		Polysilicon: China 79%	O Ingots/wafers: Chine 97%	Modules: China 75%
			Cells: Chine #5%	
			Solar glass	
Wind power			Many components are sourced in China	<ul> <li>Currently sufficien capacities in Eu- rope, but declining competitiveness</li> </ul>
Generators and motors (For	Light rare     earths: Chine 58%	Light rare earths: Chine 87%	Permanent mag- nets: China 94%	
wind power and electric mobility)	Heavy rare earths: Chine/Myenmer: 100%	Heavy rare earths: China 100%		
Electromobility Lithium-ion battery	💋 Lithium	🙎 Lithium	Cathode material: Chine 71%	💋 Battery cells
	Cobalt: Congo 72%	O Cobalt: Chine 75%		
	Manganese:     South Africe 36%	Manganeset     Chine 95%		
	<ul> <li>Nicket:</li> <li>Indonesia 38%</li> </ul>	Nickel: China 55%		
	<ul> <li>Graphite: China 73%</li> </ul>	Graphite: Chine 100%	Anode material: China 91%	
Electrolyzers	<ul> <li>Iridium (PEMEL):</li> <li>Production cannot be expanded. South Africa 85%</li> </ul>			
	Scandium (HTEL, only after 2030/35)			
Heat pumps			<ul> <li>Compressors (partly with perma- nent magnets)</li> </ul>	
Green Steel	iron ores in DRI quality			Plant engineer- ing for direct reduction plants (DRI shaft furnece)

Crucial parts of value chains (not only for the transformation) depend on key resources and strategic goods

- Partly high concentration of production and/or processing of strategic resources and/or goods in few countries (i.e. China)
- Some of them with specific geopolitical interests which should be perceived as potential threats (not only for energy transformation)

Six main counter-strategies


- Lowering short-term vulnerability (energy/resource efficiency, stockpiling)
- Safeguarding crucial cores of industrial production within Germany and/or Europe
- Diversifying the supplies of resources and strategic goods (as well as interim production steps as processing etc.)
- Going for new technologies or circular strategies that can lower the longer-term demand for resources
- Avoiding (new) lock-in effects (economic, political and contractual) and stranded assets
- International cooperation and creating new alliances

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### Global energy transformation will change international trade flows Energy commodities, transformation-related commodities and strategic goods

Case study: Net export and import positions for (green and low-carbon) hydrogen




Source: German Expert Commission for the Monitoring of the Energy Transition

Significantly changing patterns for the global economy (not only but also due to the transformation)

- Key regions will be (more or less) self-sufficient for commodities (and technologies?)
- Few regions will be significantly import-dependent for commodities (not only energy!)
- Regions with abundant clean energy resources will attract new parts of the value chains
- Global technology market for clean/resource-efficient technologies will grow, distribution of market shares is open
- Home markets will be crucial
- These are crucial coordinates
   for international cooperation

#### The new era of geopolitics Energy transformation depends crucially on it – and may contribute to it



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### Thank you very much

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